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Abstract
During the long economic slump in Japan, monetary policy in Japan has essentially consisted
of a very low interest rate (since 1995), a zero interest rate (since 1999), and quantitative easing
(since 2001). The intention seems to have been to lower expectations of future interest rates.
But the problem in a liquidity trap (when the zero lower bound on the central bank’s instrument
rate is strictly binding) is rather to raise private-sector expectations of the future price level.
Increased expectations of a higher future price level are likely to be much more eﬀective in
reducing the real interest rate and stimulating the economy out of a liquidity trap than a
further reduction of already very low expectations of future interest rates. Therefore, monetary-
policy alternatives in a liquidity trap should be assessed according to how eﬀective they are
likely to be in aﬀecting private-sector expectations of the future price level. Expectations of
a higher future price level would lead to current depreciation of the currency. Quantitative
easing would induce expectations of a higher price level if it were expected to be permanent.
The absence of a depreciation of the yen and other evidence indicates that the quantitative
easing is not expected to be permanent. In an open economy, the Foolproof Way (consisting
of a price-level target path, currency depreciation and commitment to a currency peg and a
zero interest rate until the price-level target path has been reached) is likely to be the most
eﬀective policy to raise expectations of the future price level, stimulate the economy, and escape
from a liquidity trap. It is the ﬁrst-best policy to end stagnation and deﬂation in Japan. The
Foolproof Way without the explicit exchange-rate policy, namely a price-level target path and a
commitment to a zero interest rate until the price-level target path has been reached, would be
a second-best policy. The current policy, a commitment to a zero interest rate until inﬂation has
become nonnegative is at best a third-best policy, since it accommodates all deﬂation that has
occurred before inﬂation turns nonnegative and therefore is not eﬀective in inducing inﬂation
expectations.
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in the GDP deﬂator since 1995 and in the CPI since 1998. The Bank of Japan has responded
with a very low instrument rate (the overnight call rate) of 50 basis points since the end of 1995, a
zero instrument rate since 1999 (except an increase to 25 basis points during August 2000-March
2001), and “quantitative easing” with a zero interest rate and a large expansion of the monetary
base since March 2001 (Oda and Ueda [15], Eggertsson and Ostry [7]). The Bank has also made “a
commitment to continue with this ample provision of liquidity until the year-on-year rate of change
in the consumer price index (excluding fresh food, on a nationwide basis) registers zero percent
or higher on a sustainable basis” (Bank of Japan [2]). This monetary-policy response has so far
not stopped deﬂation in Japan, and the Bank of Japan has not gained control of the price level.
Japan is in a liquidity trap–a situation when the zero lower bound for the instrument rate (ZLB)
is strictly binding, in the sense that it prevents the central bank from setting its instrument rate
at its optimal level.
What is the problem in a liquidity trap? The problem is that, even though the instrument rate
is at zero, the real (short) interest rate is too high and the economy is in a recession and/or inﬂation
is too low, perhaps even negative. The central bank would prefer a lower real interest rate and a
more expansionary monetary-policy stance, if that were possible.
But, how can the problem be solved? The real interest rate can be lowered by the central bank
inducing private-sector expectations of a higher future price level. If expected inﬂation increases,
the real interest rate falls, even if the nominal interest rate is unchanged at zero.
But, how can the central bank induce such expectations of a higher future price level? Indeed,
this is the real problem in a liquidity trap.
Consequently, in assessments of policy alternatives in a liquidity trap, the focus should be
on how eﬀective the policy alternatives are in aﬀecting expectations of the future price level.I n
contrast, the Bank of Japan’s policy of a zero interest rate, quantitative easing, and the related
commitment seems intended to lower expectations of future interest rates a n di nt h i sw a ys t i m u l a t e
the economy. But any reduction of already low expectations of future interest rates are likely to
be much less eﬀective in reducing real interest rates than increased expectations of the future price
level.1
1 Although, in some cases, a particular path of future interest rates may induce desirable price-level expectations
in equilibrium, this way of aﬀecting price-level expectations is certainly very indirect and in practice fraught with
many diﬃculties. Furthermore, an interest-rate commitment need not in itself be suﬃcient to uniquely determine
the price level, as emphasized long ago by Sargent and Wallace [16] and more recently–in the context of a liquidity
trap–by Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe [3].
1Quantitative easing would lead to expectations of a higher future price level, if it the quantita-
tive easing were expected to be permanent. Expectations of a higher price level would immediately
show up in a current depreciation of the yen. The absence of such a depreciation indicates that
the quantitative easing is not expected to be permanent, and that the Bank of Japan has failed
dramatically in inducing expectations of a higher price level.
In an open economy such as Japan, the Foolproof Way–consisting of (1) a price-level target
path, (2) a depreciation and temporary peg of the currency, and (3) an exit strategy to a ﬂoating
exchange rate and inﬂation or price level targeting when the price-level target has been reached
(Svensson [17], [18], and [20])–is likely to be the most eﬀective monetary policy to stimulate the
economy, escape from a liquidity trap, and give the Bank of Japan control of the price level.
Indeed, the Foolproof Way with a price-level target path, a currency depreciation, and a com-
mitment to an exchange-rate peg and a zero interest rate until the price-level target path has been
reached can be seen as a ﬁrst-best policy to end stagnation and deﬂation in Japan. The Foolproof
Way without the explicit exchange-rate policy, namely a price-level target path and a commitment
to a zero interest rate until the price-level target path has been reached, would be a second-best
policy. The current policy, a commitment to a zero interest rate until inﬂation has become non-
n e g a t i v ei sa tb e s tathird-best policy. The problem with this policy is that it accommodates all
deﬂation that has occurred before inﬂation turns nonnegative and hence is not eﬀective in inducing
inﬂation expectations.
1. In a liquidity trap, the real interest is too high; the real interest rate can be
lowered by expectations of a higher future price level
Let me use a small New Keynesian model for illustration. Let xt ≡ yt−¯ yt denote the output gap in
the current period t,w h e r eyt denotes (log) output and ¯ yt denotes (log) potential output. I assume
that potential output is an exogenous stochastic process. Let rt denote the (short) real interest
rate,
rt ≡ it − πt+1|t ≡ it − (pt+1|t − pt);
where it denotes the nominal interest rate, the instrument rate; πt+1|t denotes private-sector one-
period-ahead inﬂation expectations; pt denotes the (log) price level; and pt+1|t denotes the expected
one-period-ahead (log) price level. Let ¯ rt denote the neutral (real) interest rate–the Wicksellian
natural interest rate, the real interest rate that would arise in a hypothetical ﬂex-price economy
2with output equal to potential output. In the simplest case, the neutral interest rate is given by
¯ rt ≡ ρt +
1
σ
(¯ yt+1|t − ¯ yt),
where ρt is the rate of time preference (an exogenous stochastic process) and the positive constant
σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption. Hence, the neutral interest rate is
determined by the rate of time preference and expected potential-output growth. The output gap
depends positively on the expected future output gap, xt+1|t, and negatively on the real-interest-rate
gap, rt − ¯ rt, according to the aggregate-demand relation,
xt = xt+1|t − σ(rt − ¯ rt),
which follows from a ﬁrst-order condition for optimal consumption choice. The aggregate-demand
relation can be solved forward to period t + T,
xt = xt+T|t − σ
T−1 X
τ=0
(rt+τ|t − ¯ rt+τ|t).
This expression shows that the current output gap depends positively on the expected output
gap T periods ahead, xt+T|t, and negatively on the sum of the current and expected future real-
interest-rate gaps, rt+τ|t − ¯ rt+τ|t, for the next T periods. I choose the horizon T such that the
economy is expected to then be back to normal, in the sense that the output gap is expected to
then be approximately equal to zero, xt+T|t ≈ 0. The current output gap then only depends on
the sum of the current and expected future real-interest-rate gaps for the next T periods. If the
current output gap is negative, so there is a recession, this is because the sum of the current and
expected future real-interest-rate gaps is too high–that is, because the current and expected real
interest rates are too high relative to the natural interest rates.
Since the economy is expected to be back to normal T periods ahead, the current output gap




(it+τ|t − πt+1+τ|t − ¯ rt+τ|t)=−σ
T−1 X
τ=0




where the ﬁrst equality uses the deﬁnition of the real interest rate, and the second equality uses
the fact that the sum of future inﬂation equals the total change of the (log) price level. I assume
that the economy is expected to be in or close to a liquidity trap during the next T periods, so the
expected instrument rates for that period are approximately zero, it+τ|t ≈ 0( 0≤ τ ≤ T −1).T h e n
the ﬁrst term on the right side is approximately zero. For a given current price level pt (I assume
3that the current price level is sticky and in the short run approximately given), the output gap
depends only on the expected price level T periods ahead, pt+T|t, and the sum of the expected
neutral interest rates during the next T periods:




If the output gap is negative, so the economy is in a recession, this is for two reasons: The sum
of the current and expected future neutral interest rates,
PT−1
τ=0 ¯ rt+τ|t,i st o ol o w ,a n dt h es u m
of the current and expected future real interest rates,
XT−1
τ=0 rt+τ|t ≈− (pt+T|t − pt),i st o oh i g h .
That is, the expected future price level, pt+T|t, is too low. It follows that the real interest rate
can be lowered and the negative output gap reduced or eliminated, if the central bank can induce
private-sector expectations of a higher future price level.2
However, the Bank of Japan’s policy has mostly been about stimulating the economy and
reducing the negative output gap by inducing private-sector expectations of lower future instrument
rates. Thus, in the case when the expected future instrument rates during the next T periods are
not exactly zero but positive, they can perhaps be reduced further towardz e r o . H o w e v e r ,t h e y
are already small, so what can be gained is small. Furthermore, perhaps the private-sector can be
induced to expect instrument rates close to zero also after period T, after the liquidity trap is over.
In the above framework, this would amount to creating expectations of a positive rather than a
zero output gap T periods ahead, xt+T|t > 0, which would reduce the current negative output gap.
It seems likely that any such attempt to lower expectations of future instrument rates toward zero,
when these expectations are already low to start with, will have very small, second-order eﬀects on
the current output gap.
In contrast, there is potentially a large ﬁrst-order eﬀect on the output gap from increasing
expectations of the future price level. This is where I wish that the focus of the Bank of Japan had
been.
2. How can the central bank aﬀect expectations of the future price level?
The insight that the principal solution to the problem of a liquidity trap involves aﬀecting private-
sector expectations of the future price level is due to Krugman [13]. Krugman also noted that this
principal solution immediately encounters a practical problem, a credibility problem, in that it is
2 Jung, Teranishi, and Watanabe [11] and Eggertsson and Woodford [8] characterize the precise optimal expecta-
tions of the future price level and the related optimal credible price-level targets for escaping from a liquidity trap in
a closed economy. Svensson [20] characterizes the optimal policy in a simple open-economy model.
4not so easy for a central bank to purposely aﬀect such private-sector expectations. In particular,
a central bank that has built a reputation for consistent low-inﬂation policy, such as the Bank of
Japan, ﬁnds it particularly diﬃcult to convince the private sector that it suddenly wants the price
level to increase substantially.
2.1. Expanding the money supply
One potential way to aﬀect expectations of the future price level is by increasing the money supply.
As Krugman noted, this is eﬀective only if an increase in the money supply is perceived by the
private sector to be permanent. Unfortunately, there is no commitment mechanism through which
a modern central bank can commit itself to a particular future money supply.3
We can see this in the above framework. I choose the horizon T such that the liquidity trap
is expected to be over and interest rates are expected to be positive beginning in period t + T,
it+T|t > 0.T oaﬁrst approximation, we may take demand for the monetary base to be proportional
to nominal GDP when interest rates are positive. This implies (disregarding any constant),
pt+T|t ≈ mt+T|t − yt+T|t,
where mt+T|t denotes the expected (log) monetary base T periods ahead. That is, the expected
future price level is approximately directly related positively to the expected future monetary base
and negatively to the expected future output level. If the central bank could aﬀect private-sector
expectations of the future monetary base, it would, everything else equal, also aﬀect private-sector
expectations of the future price level to the same extent.
Unfortunately, it is not easy for a central bank to directly aﬀect expectations of the future
monetary base. The Bank of Japan’s quantitative easing provides an unusually clear-cut example.
In March 2001, the Bank of Japan initiated a dramatic expansion of the monetary base. By the
summer of 2005, the monetary base had increased by about 67 percent. Suppose that the private
sector would believe that an expansion of the monetary base of this magnitude is permanent.
The private sector would then believe that, some time in the future (for concreteness, say in four
years) when the Japanese liquidity trap is over, nominal GDP would be up by approximately 67
percent (taking nominal GDP to have been approximately constant since 2001). Suppose that the
private sector believes that the Japanese GDP in the next four years will be up approximately
10 percent. The private sector would then believe that in four years the price level would be up
3 Auerbach and Obstfeld [1] examine in some detail the eﬀects of a permanent expansion of the money supply in
a liquidity trap in some detail under the explicit assumption that the permanent expansion is credible.
5by approximately 100(167/110 − 1) = 52 percent. If this were the case, either the yen would
depreciate by approximately 50 percent or long Japanese interest rates would rise substantially,
or some combination thereof would occur (see below for details on this point). Obviously, neither
of these events has occurred. The obvious conclusion is that the private sector does not believe
that the expansion of the monetary base is permanent. The quantitative easing has not aﬀected
price-level expectations and has in this respect been a dramatic failure.
2.2. An inﬂation target or a price-level target
An inﬂation target or (better) a price-level target would be a ﬁne solution, if it were credible.
However, just announcing the target would not be enough: The announcement would have to
be combined with statements and actions that make it credible. This seems to be a particular
problem for central banks like the Federal Reserve and the Bank of Japan, since they have clearly
demonstrated over many years their notorious aversion to any numerical target or other very explicit
commitment.
2.3. Fiscal policy
Regarding ﬁscal policy, a ﬁscal expansion–an increase in the ﬁscal deﬁcit–may or may not be
expansionary and increase aggregate demand, depending on the composition of the ﬁscal expendi-
ture, the degree of Ricardian equivalence, and so forth. Typically, Ricardian equivalence does not
seem to hold, and a ﬁscal deﬁcit is expansionary; however, private-sector behavior may be closer
to Ricardian equivalence in a crisis situation with a perceived unsustainable ﬁscal and an expected
immanent ﬁscal consolidation with increased taxes and/or reduced beneﬁts. Japan has certainly
t r i e da ne x p a n s i o n a r yﬁscal policy. This has not led to an escape from the liquidity trap, but it
has certainly led to a dramatic deterioration of Japan’s public ﬁnances.
Am o n e y - ﬁnanced rather than debt-ﬁnanced ﬁscal expansion is often proposed as a remedy
against a liquidity trap. But it is often not understood that, for a given ﬁscal deﬁcit and aside from
any debt-induced inﬂation incentives for government-controlled (rather than independent) central
banks, money- or debt-ﬁnancing matters through exactly the same mechanism as that discussed
above in regard to expanding the money supply. Money ﬁnancing of a ﬁscal expansion will have
an eﬀect on expectations of the future price level only to the extent that it is interpreted as a
permanent expansion of the money supply. Again, since there is no commitment mechanism for the
future money supply, current money ﬁnancing of a deﬁcit does not exclude that the money supply
6will be reduced in the future. Money-ﬁnancing hence provides no separate mechanism to aﬀect
expectations of the future price level.
2.4. The Foolproof Way
In several papers (Svensson [17], [18], and [20] and Jeanne and Svensson [10]), I have promoted the
Foolproof Way to escape from a liquidity trap (FPW) as an eﬀective policy. The FPW involves
the announcement and the implementation of (1) a price-level target, (2) a currency depreciation
and a temporary peg consistent with price-level target, and (3) an exit strategy, when the price-
level target has been reached, according to which the currency is ﬂoated and either inﬂation or
price-level targeting is instituted. Because the FPW involves using the exchange rate as a policy
instrument and the Ministry of Finance is formally responsible for exchange-rate policy in Japan,
the implementation of the FPW would require some degree of cooperation between the Ministry of
Finance and the Bank of Japan.4
In terms of the above framework, the purpose is to induce private-sector expectations of a
higher future price level, such that the real interest rate falls and the economy expands out of the
liquidity trap. Let the price level target for period t+T, ˆ pt+T, be such that price-level expectations
satisfying
pt+T|t =ˆ pt+T, (2.1)
and zero instrument rates during the next T − 1 periods would be adequate to achieve the desired
fall in the real interest rate and increased stimulus of the economy. Price-level expectations and
exchange-rate expectations will be related according to
pt+T|t = st+T|t + p∗
t+T|t − qt+T|t, (2.2)
where st denotes the (log) exchange rate, p∗
t denotes the (log) foreign price level, and qt denotes
the (log) real exchange rate. I choose the horizon T such that the economy is expected to be
back to normal; in particular, such that the real exchange rate is expected to be back to its
natural/neutral/potential level, ¯ qt+T|t, and hence can be treated as exogenous from the point of
current monetary policy. I assume that the foreign price level can be taken as exogenous. Under
these assumptions, the expected future price level and the expected future exchange rate are directly
related and move together.
4 McCallum, in [14] and more recent publications, has emphasized the important role of the exchange rate as a
monetary-policy instrument when the ZLB is binding.
7By interest parity, the current exchange rate is related to the expected future exchange rate
and the interest-rate diﬀerential between the home and foreign interest rate, it − i∗
t,b y









where the second equality follows from solving forward T periods. By (2.2), we get
st = pt+T|t −
T−1 X
τ=0
it+τ|t + ... ,
where exogenous terms have been left out. Expected future instrument rates approximately equal
to zero imply that the current exchange rate is directly related to and moves together with the
expected future price level. An increase in the expected future price level corresponds to an equal
current depreciation of the currency. The exchange-rate peg of the FPW implements the exchange
rate consistent with the future price-level target and the zero instrument rate.5 If the FPW and
its price-level target are immediately credible, the price-level expectations will rise to fulﬁll (2.1),
and the currency will, by (2.2), depreciate by the same amount, and the peg will not be binding.
Otherwise, the peg forces private-sector price-level expectations to be consistent with the price-level
target.
Many comments on the FPW have suggested that a potential improving eﬀect on the trade
balance of the peg’s currency depreciation may be problematic for the trading partners. However,
any eﬀects on the trade balance are exactly the same as those that would result from a credible
price-level target without any peg, or a lower instrument rate, if that were not prevented by the
ZLB. The truth is that any truly expansionary monetary policy would imply a currency depreciation
and a trade-balance eﬀect. Furthermore, any trade-balance net eﬀect from expansionary monetary
policy consists of income and substitution eﬀects of opposite signs. In a liquidity trap and a deep
recession, the income eﬀect on the trade balance may be particularly strong and actually improve
the trade balance for the trading partners. Finally, nothing prevents the trading partners from
conducting expansionary monetary policy to counteract any contractionary eﬀect from the FPW.
In this way, an optimal world monetary expansion may be achieved (see Svensson [20] for an analysis
of the international eﬀects of the FPW).6
5 The peg may need a rate of crawl to be exactly consistent with a zero home instrument rate. A constant peg
w o u l di m p l yah o m ei n s t r u m e n tr a t ee q u a lt ot h ef o r eign short interest rate, but the practical diﬀerence is small.
6 One possible problem with the FPW is the possible incentive for the central bank to renege in the future by
an unanticipated currency appreciation, so as to achieve a low inﬂation ex post. However, Jeanne and Svensson
[10]–starting from (1) the fact that a currency appreciation depreciates the home-currency value of foreign exchange
reserves and (2) the strong aversion towards negative central-bank capital revealed by central-bank oﬃcials and noted
by central-bank commentators–show that a central bank can manage its capital such that it creates a commitment
not to appreciate the currency in the future.
8Figure 2.1: Alternative price-level target paths starting from 1995 and the CPI (excluding fresh
food) for Japan















The FPW was ﬁrst presented at a prominent international conference organized by the Bank of
Japan in the summer of 2000.7 At that time, Japan had experienced deﬂa t i o ni nt h eG D Pd e ﬂator
for about ﬁve years and had been close to or in a liquidity trap for about two years. My guess is
that most conference participants did not anticipate that Japan would still be in a liquidity trap a
full ﬁve years later.
Suppose that the FPW had been implemented in the summer of 2000. Suppose that a price-level
target path had been announced as the CPI (excluding fresh food) increasing at the rate of either
1 or 2 percent per year from its level in 1995, as in ﬁgure 2.1. This would have induced a “price
gap” between the price-level target and the actual CPI of about either 3 or 8 percent in 2000, as
in ﬁgure 2.2.8 Thus, at that time, the required depreciation of the yen to undo those price gaps
would have been about either 3 or 8 percent, depending upon which price-level target path had
been announced. The peg would have been maintained (possibly in the form of a crawling peg)
until the price level had started to rise and approach the price-level target path.9 When the price
7 The conference papers were later published in Monetary and Economic Studies 19(S-1) 2001.
8 As emphasized by Bernanke [4] and [5], several years of zero or negative deﬂa t i o nh a v em o s tl i k e l yr e s u l t e di na
price gap that should be undone–a price level below previous expectations that has increased the real value of debt
and deteriorated balance sheets for banks and ﬁrms.
9 Pegging a currency that is strong and under appreciation pressure is always possible, since it can be defended
by the purchase of foreign exchange at the pegged rate with domestic currency that can be issued in ever-increasing
amounts. Pegging a currency that is weak and under depreciation pressure is more diﬃcult, since its defence requires
9Figure 2.2: Price gaps for alternative price-level target paths starting from 1995, percent









level would have reached the price-level target path, the peg would have been abandoned, and the
Bank of Japan would have shifted to inﬂation or price-level targeting.
Suppose the FPW would be implemented soon in 2005. With the same price-level target paths,
the required depreciation of the yen would now be about 11 or 23 percent (ﬁgure 2.2). If instead the
price-level target paths would be announced as starting from the CPI in 2000, the corresponding
price gaps and required currency depreciations would be about 8 or 15 percent.
3. Conclusion
In conclusion, regarding monetary-policy alternatives in a liquidity trap, it seems obvious to me
that it is better to focus on policies that can aﬀect expectations of the future price level rather
than just expectations of future interest rates. The eﬀect of changing price-level expectations and
exchange rates should be much more powerful than that of changing long nominal interest rates or
expectations of future short interest rates that are already rather close to zero. Obviously, there is
no bound to exchange rates and price level expectations similar to that on nominal interest rates.
Japan still has the option to implement the Foolproof Way as a policy to end deﬂation and
eventually shifting to a regime of inﬂation or price-level targeting that can support a sustained
the purchase of domestic currency with limited foreign exchange reserves that may eventually run out (see Svensson
[17] and [18] for details).
10recovery of the Japanese economy. The Foolproof Way with a price-level target path, a currency
depreciation, and a commitment to an exchange-rate peg and a zero interest rate until the price-
level target path has been reached can be seen as a ﬁrst-best policy to end stagnation and deﬂation
in Japan. The Foolproof Way without the explicit exchange-rate policy, namely a price-level target
path and a commitment to a zero interest rate until the price-level target path has been reached,
would be a second-best policy. The current policy, a commitment to a zero interest rate until
inﬂation has become nonnegative is at best a third-best policy. The problem with this policy is
that it accommodates all deﬂation that has occurred before inﬂation turns nonnegative and hence
is not eﬀective in inducing inﬂation expectations.
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